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In the last decades, quite a lot of experiments dealing with fairness have been 
published. This review summarizes the evidence. Our aim is to understand the 
importance of fairness on subjects’ decision making process in some specific contexts. 
For that purpose, in this dissertation we review literature trying to find evidence of 
fairness motivations on subjects, and we decide to focus our attention on three groups 
of experiments, concretely bargaining, public goods and market experiments. As 
regards bargaining experiments, both in the ultimatum game and the dictator game 
subjects offer positive and significantly high shares of the available amount, around 
30%-40% and 20%-30% respectively, even though in the dictator game proposals 
cannot be rejected. Subjects do not only care about their own payoff and situation, but 
also about their peers. In this sense, property rights are crucial for explaining subjects’ 
decision making. In the case of public goods experiments, positive and substantial 
contributions to the public good are observed, which are on average between 40%-
60% of the total endowment. However, repetition leads to a gradual reduction on 
contributions, which is clearly cut by introducing a punishment option, even if this is 
costly for subjects. As for market experiments, employers offer wages well above the 
market-clearing level and workers respond with high effort levels. Nonetheless, the way 
effort is determined (endogenously or exogenously) strongly affects fairness 
enforcement decisions on subjects. 
Keywords: Fairness, experiments, ultimatum game, dictator game, public goods, 
market experiments. 
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FAIRNESS IN THE LABORATORY: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation aims at reviewing and summarising the results and conclusions 
from several laboratory experiments in the field of economics related to fairness. In 
particular, we review experimental evidence of fairness motivations on subjects 
focusing on different groups of experiments, namely bargaining, market and public 
goods. We decide to focus our attention on the games previously mentioned because 
they are the most common and basic ones, and those in which fairness concerns can 
be more explicitly found. 
Our review of literature is more extensive than previous ones, such as Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), or Camerer and Thaler (1995) since we include a wider time span and 
variety of experiments. Therefore, this project may serve as a source of information for 
those willing to prove and understand the existence of concerns of fairness on 
subjects, as well as a tool to broaden the knowledge on this issue, through the 
replication and modification of the reviewed experiments. 
The personal motivation to perform this work is to go a step further on the approach 
to experimental economics started when replicating and implementing an experiment in 
Doñate-Buendía (2017). This Bachelor’s Degree thesis tried to prove the existence of 
gender differences on fairness and altruism in the context of a punishment game, 
based on the study by Eckel & Grossman (1996), which will be later on explained. For 
that purpose, a pilot experiment was carried out through a survey replicating the study 
by these authors, but adding an additional treatment to the original experimental 
design. Under this new setting, subjects had to give up a higher amount of money than 
in the original experiment so as to punish an unfair player and compensate a fair 
subject. In that way, subjects’ willingness to punish unfair behaviour was analysed. 
Since there is not a common consensus on what fairness1 is, we will define it in the 
more appropriate way according to the analysis that is going to be carried out in this 
dissertation. 
                                               
1 Fairness can be defined in several different ways. For instance, according to the acceptations 
found in some dictionaries fairness is: “the quality of treating people equally or in a way that is 
right or reasonable”, “impartial and just treatment or behaviour without favouritism or 
discrimination”, or even “the property of being fair or equitable”.  
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For that reason, we need to talk about John Rawls, an American philosopher who, in 
his book A Theory of Justice tried to solve the problem of distributive justice, that is, the 
socially just distribution of goods in a society. The theory he developed is known as 
“Justice as Fairness”, and the basic idea is that justice is based on two main principles, 
liberty and equality. Thus, Rawls (1958, p.164) considered that: “the fundamental idea 
in the concept of justice is fairness”. 
According to Rawls (1958), the concept of fairness is relevant when a group of 
people participate in a common activity and need to establish the basic rules defining it 
and determining the rights and duties of each one of the members of the group. 
Moreover, the activity in question is fair when no one feels that any other person may 
take advantage of others, or that someone may be forced to accede to illegitimate 
petitions of others. Furthermore, each person has a perception of reasonable and 
legitimate claims that should be commonly recognised. 
Having that in mind, we define fairness as a concept based on two main ideas: 
justice and equity. Thus, fairness means that everything is equal, that is, there is no 
favouritism or discrimination, no biases exist and everyone has the same rights and 
duties. Moreover, people obtain what they merit, according to their effort and their 
behaviour towards others. 
Hence, we will now review the experimental literature on fairness trying to 
understand and explain the different settings authors have used until now in order to 
analyse this issue, as well as the different results and conclusions they have found. My 
hope is that this dissertation helps researchers by providing them with a summary of 
what has already been done and thus, what else could be examined to this respect. 
Quite a lot of research has been done on social preferences, on fairness in 
particular, and mainly in the last three decades, when experimental economics took off 
with the regular publication of economic experiments in mainstream economic journals, 
the establishment of the Economic Science Association and the launch of the journal 
Experimental Economics. And most importantly, with the Nobel Prize awarded to 
Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman in 2002 "for having established laboratory 
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 As the last meaning says, fairness is undoubtedly the attribute of being fair, but regarding this 
last concept, there is also a wide range of possible definitions. From the simplest ones, such as 
“proper under the rules”, “just or appropriate in the circumstances”, “free from bias, dishonesty, 
or injustice”, or “reasonable, right and just” to the more complex, like “if something is fair, it is 
reasonable and is what you expect or deserve” or “treating someone in a way that is right or 




experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of 
alternative market mechanisms" and "for having integrated insights from psychological 
research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-
making under uncertainty", respectively. 
The data used in the dissertation is economic experiments carried out in the 
laboratory. We analyse and compare the different settings and results which can be 
derived from them. Concretely, we include a broad range of articles, from the 1940s to 
2018, and the method we use for their selection is to start from seminal papers and 
then deal with the relevant references in them for the objective of our work. 
The remaining part of the dissertation is organised as follows. Section 2 presents 
several studies and their results on bargaining experiments concerning fairness. In 
section 3 the main public goods experiments on fairness are explained. Section 4 
consists of a review of the literature on how fairness is dealt with in market 
experiments. Section 5 shows the summary and discussion of the reviewed literature.  
2. Fairness in bargaining experiments 
Bargaining is one of the main areas of study in experimental economics, of which 
several experiments have been carried out over the years, and which implies a huge 
range of everyday life situations. Some examples which illustrate a bargaining process 
are the following ones: the decision of a labour market reform between employers and 
unions, the negotiation of the wage between employers and employees for the latter, 
the divorce agreement of a couple, or even simpler, the bargaining process between an 
individual and a telecommunications company. 
This concept refers to a situation in which two or more subjects must reach an 
agreement on the issue at stake. In the broad definition of bargaining experiments we 
find two games which are the most representative ones of this kind of interaction 
between subjects, the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Although the second one 
does not actually follow a bargaining process, it is included in this classification 
because it can be considered a restricted version of the other game. 
The ultimatum game is the interaction between two players who have to decide on 
the distribution of a given initial endowment. The first player, the proposer, makes a 
choice on the allocation for both subjects, and the other player, the responder, can 
accept or reject that proposal. If the offer is accepted, the money is split as agreed, 
whereas if the offer is rejected, none of the players gets any amount from the 
endowment. 
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The dictator game is a kind of interaction in which two subjects participate, but only 
one of them makes a decision; that is, the dictator, who has to decide on the division of 
a determined amount of money between him/her and the other player, who cannot 
reject the offer. 
In the following subsections we will review the literature concerning fairness and 
which is based on either ultimatum or dictator game experiments. 
2.1. Fairness in the ultimatum game 
This game is firstly introduced by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982). In their 
basic setting, the subjects are divided into two groups, being each one assigned the 
role of proposer or responder. The proposers have to divide a certain amount of 
money, which varies between 4 and 10 currency units, and the responders have to 
decide whether to accept the offer or not. The game is repeated with the same sample 
of subjects one week later.  
The main results are that proposers offer significantly high amounts of money, but 
many subjects reject these proposals. And when the game is repeated, proposers 
demand greater amounts and responders continue rejecting positive offers. So, this is 
a clear example of people behaving differently from what it is expected from rationality. 
And it is the first evidence of fairness motivations on subjects’ behaviour. 
In this line, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a) implement an ultimatum game 
in which each subject has to choose among a range of allocations of $10, from 
$9.5;$0.5 to $5;$5, with variations of $0.5 each time, deciding the ones that are 
acceptable and unacceptable for them. Later on, they have to make the decision of the 
division of the given amount of money between them and another subject. The results 
show that many subjects consider positive offers unacceptable, and the distributions 
are generous, contrary to the theoretical prediction, suggesting that subjects are 
concerned about fairness enforcement. 
Ochs and Roth (1989) use another setting, in which the roles of subjects are 
alternatively exchanged. Therefore, if the responder rejects the offer made by the 
proposer, their roles change and a new decision is made. It is important to highlight 
that a discount factor is applied to the available amount of money. In particular, in each 
period subjects have to divide 100 chips, and the discount factor can be the same for 
both players or different for each one of them. 
The main observations are, according to related literature, that substantial positive 
amounts are offered and in many cases they are rejected. Moreover, a great number of 
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counterproposals are disadvantageous, that is, the proposer keeps a lower amount 
than the one the responder has previously offered him/her. Hence, it is concluded that 
subjects’ concerns about fairness do exist and are highly relevant on their decision 
making process. 
Prasnikar and Roth (1992) conclude in their study, through the analysis of several 
experimental results on ultimatum games that fairness plays a fundamental role in 
subjects’ preferences and/or expectations. In fact, it determines the observed 
outcomes in this kind of game. 
In this context it is also important to name the main conclusions stated by Falk, Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2003). They examine the effect of fairness considerations by the 
sensitivity of subjects to the distribution of income and find that identical offers in an 
ultimatum game steadily generate diverse rejection rates depending on the other 
available alternatives for the proposer. The authors implement four mini-ultimatum 
games, being the role of proposers and respondents randomly assigned to subjects. 
The proposer can choose between two allocations; the first one is the same in the four 
games, and the other one differs from game to game. Each respondent has to indicate 
his/her response in both decision nodes without knowing the choice of the proposer.  
The main result of this study is that subjects are more willing to reject an uneven 
offer when the proposer has more equitable alternatives to choose than if the other 
possible options are more uneven, since identical actions may indicate different facts 
about the intention of the proposer. For that reason, the authors state that the utility of 
an action is very much related to the other disposable options. In this sense, a good 
fairness model should include both intentions and distributional concerns as key 
elements to explain this kind of behaviour. 
Ho and Su (2009) run two independent ultimatum games, played sequentially by a 
leader and two followers. The leader has to divide 100 points between him/herself and 
the first follower. After this decision, the same interaction is repeated with the second 
follower, who receives a public signal of the offer made to his/her peer, and therefore 
can infer the corresponding payoff. 
As in related literature, the main finding is that positive offers are made (around 30-
40% on average) and the rejection rate is substantial. Moreover, in this context, it 
emerges what the authors call peer-induced fairness, that is, the fact that the second 
follower is not willing to get a lower amount than the one the other follower receives. 
Additionally, the leader is found to adapt the second offer to the inference that can be 
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made by the second follower, that is, the offer changes according to the corresponding 
signal. 
Hence, the authors prove that peer-induced fairness takes place and is important 
when analysing this kind of interaction. 
Hoffman et al. (1994) try to understand the underlying motives of the preferences for 
fairness observed by other authors. For that purpose, they carry out one-shot 
ultimatum and dictator games, which are framed as a market exchange. The authors 
use two treatments in which the roles of buyer and seller are randomly assigned (first 
treatment) or assigned by the results of a contest in which subjects have to answer to 
10 questions (second treatment). In all cases, the amount to be divided between the 
participants is $10. 
The main conclusions from this work are that property rights are one of the driving 
elements of subjects’ behaviour, since first, they assume the money belongs to them 
and, second, those who score highest in the quiz think they deserve that money. And 
this leads to lower offers. Therefore, in the random assignment treatment offers are 
greater than in the contest treatment. And the key element behind the commonly 
observed preferences for fairness is anonymity, with respect to other subjects, to the 
experimentalists, and to everyone else. 
In this sense, Bolton and Zwick (1995) test the anonymity hypothesis together with a 
punishment hypothesis, which states that subjects are willing to punish those who treat 
them unfairly. They implement an ultimatum game in order to analyse the accurate 
explanation for the observation of fair outcomes. And what they find is that the 
punishment hypothesis explains much more of the deviation from the perfect 
equilibrium than the anonymity hypothesis. 
Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) use an ultimatum game in which players bargain with 
100 chips that have different monetary payoffs to each type of subject within the pairs. 
Additionally, the information they have regarding the corresponding returns varies. In 
fact, in some cases only one player knows both payoffs, and in the rest both of them 
are aware of that information. Nevertheless, players always know their own payoffs and 
there is common knowledge on whether other players know each other’s payoffs. The 
game is repeated 10 times. 
The results they find are that when only the proposer is fully informed, the mean 
offer is below 50, and when the corresponding payoff is low, this amount is even 
smaller. Therefore, no concerns for fairness are found in this case. But, when it is the 
responder who has all the information, rejection rates substantially increase. Finally, 
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when both subjects are fully informed, proposers offer on average half of the pie, but 
rejection rates are really high (52%), so that the proposals increase until reaching 
nearly the mean of 64 chips in the last period. This shows that proposers are not 
worried about fairness; in fact they show a selfish behaviour, whereas responders have 
fairness motivations, and want to get an equal split of the total amount, rejecting any 
other proposal. 
2.2. Fairness in the dictator game 
Forsythe et al. (1994, pp.361-362) implement the dictator game in its one-shot 
version without the opportunity for subjects to see or meet their opponents, thus 
dividing them into two separate rooms, and they find that the majority of subjects 
playing the role of the dictator renounce to important shares of the available amount of 
money in order to give it to the other player. Nonetheless, when they test the “fairness 
hypothesis” that the distributions of offers are the same in the ultimatum and dictator 
games, they find no evidence supporting it, since players are more generous in the 
ultimatum game than in the dictator game. 
Karni, Salmon and Sopher (2008) try to find evidence of subjects’ willingness to 
renounce to a higher own probability of winning a prize in order to reach a fairer 
allocation procedure. For that purpose, they implement a three-player dictator game in 
which one of them, randomly selected, has to decide on the lottery that will be used for 
choosing the winner of $15. Therefore, under this setting, the dictator has to choose 
the distribution of probabilities of getting the prize. 
This is the innovative element of the study, since subjects decide on the procedure 
rather than on the ultimate allocation of money. Thus, fairness is analysed from a 
different perspective than in most related literature. 
From the work it can be concluded that many subjects are willing to sacrifice their 
own probability of getting a prize so as to achieve a fairer allocation among the three 
participating subjects in the group. Hence, subjects clearly show fairness concerns 
under this context. 
Through two additional2 experiments, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a) 
obtain evidence of altruism and fairness motivations on subjects, who are willing to give 
up a higher payoff for themselves in order to punish a player who has been selfish or 
unfair when deciding the distribution of the initially available amount of money. The first 
                                               
2
 By additional we are referring to the previously presented ultimatum game by the same 
authors, since the study included three experiments. This study is the first one in which the 
dictator game is introduced and examined. 
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one consists in a dictator game divided in two parts; firstly, subjects have to divide $20 
with just two possible allocations: $18 for them and $2 for the other person, or $10 for 
each one, and then they have to share an amount of money with two other subjects. 
One of the possible situations in the second part of the experiment, and which is the 
most interesting case, is the one in which the player is paired with two subjects who 
behaved in a different way in a previous experiment, one was fair and the other one 
unfair. The decision the subject has to make is to give $5 to subject E, $5 to 
himself/herself and nothing to subject U, or $6 to subject U, $6 to himself/herself and 
nothing to subject E. The main results are that the majority of the subjects divide the 
$20 evenly in the first part, and that they are willing to give up $1 in order to punish an 
unfair subject.  
The second experiment is the replication of the second part of the previous one, and 
the results are similar to the previously obtained. 
The main conclusions then are that fairness assumptions are relevant to subjects, 
and that there exist a willingness to punish subjects which behave unfairly even if this 
implies lower own payoffs. 
In this sense, and regarding gender, Eckel and Grossman (1996) find that the 
behaviour of men is more stable when deciding whether to punish or not regardless of 
the relative price of punishment. Their study tries to test the existence of gender 
differences in the willingness to pay for punishing unfair subjects. For that purpose, 
they use a punishment game, that is to say, a restricted adaptation of the dictator 
game. Their framing follows that of the second part of the dictator game in Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (1986a), previously described, with the difference of subjects being 
matched with just one player, of the type chosen by the own subject.  
The main conclusions derived from this study are that for men fairness is a principle, 
so that they will behave in the same way when facing a determined situation (in this 
case of unfairness) regardless of the price, whereas women vary their actions 
depending on the circumstances, so that they are concerned by fairness motivations, 
but regarding the price attached. So, if social norms or concerns of women differ from 
men, their behaviour in economic contexts may be different. Thus, modifications to 
some market models should be applied in order to get more accurate behaviour 
predictions. 
Recently, in their study, Brañas-Garza, Capraro and Ramírez (2018) conclude that 
women are more altruistic and also more expected to be so than men. They implement 
a dictator game for a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk crowd workers in the US, 
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that is, a different sample from those of students commonly used in economic 
laboratory experiments. They find that women give significantly more than men. 
Moreover, expected altruism among women is much higher than that of men. 
Therefore, women might be more concerned about fairness enforcement than men. 
Schurter and Wilson (2009) examine the similarities and differences between the 
social concepts of justice and fairness through four different treatments of a dictator 
game. The treatments differ on an entitlement stage, in which the assignment of the 
roles of players varies according to different rules. Subjects may accept those rules 
and participate or reject them and leave the experiment, after receiving their show-up 
fee. In one treatment subjects’ roles are randomly assigned by the computer; while in 
another one they take a quiz with general questions about their university and the roles 
are determined according to the ranking of their scores. In the third treatment, the roles 
are assigned by playing a game of chance, in particular, a die roll game in which 
subjects choose even or odd. In the last treatment, subjects are ranked according to 
the number of credit hours they have completed and then paired according to that 
ranking. Thus, the treatments differ on the use or not of a deserving ranking and a fair 
procedure in the entitlement stage. 
The main result is that offers in the treatment involving a quiz as well as in the last 
treatment are lower than in the treatment where the roles are randomly assigned and in 
the treatment with the die roll game. This shows that the existence of a deserving 
ranking is relevant for subjects, whereas the fair procedure is not. Then, the authors 
conclude that fairness and justice are different concepts in the context of a dictator 
game and that justice is the element that legitimizes a dictator’s property right, that is, it 
makes the dictator believe he/she deserves a higher share of the endowment. 
In their experiment, Cappelen et al. (2007) use a setting in which subjects are 
heterogeneous regarding both talent and effort, being the first characteristic inherent 
and the second one acquired. Effort is modelled as the money each subject wants to 
invest in production, whereas talent corresponds to the return on that investment (low 
or high, randomly assigned). After the production stage, subjects are paired with one 
player with low return and another one with high return, and they play a dictator game, 
that is to say, they decide on the distribution of the aggregate income. Authors assume 
subjects have a fairness ideal such that they obtain a greater disutility the more they 
deviate form that fair distribution. And their optimal proposal depends on that fairness 
ideal and on the relevance assigned to fairness considerations. In particular, three 
different fairness ideals are considered (strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, liberal 
egalitarianism). 
12 
They find, firstly, an average proposal of 27.1%, which may be due to higher 
concerns for fairness of subjects because of the existence of a production phase. And 
secondly, through several regressions, they observe that subjects demand almost all 
their own production but just two-thirds of the opponent’s production, and ask for a 
higher share of the opponent’s production if it is derived from a high rate of return 
rather than a high investment. These observations show that for some subjects the 
distinction between effort and talent actually matters and that a hypothesis of pluralism 
of fairness ideals does hold in reality. 
Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2003) conduct an experiment based on the setting of a 
standard dictator game but in which subjects’ efficiency, measured by the sum of 
individual payoffs, can rise through the giving of gifts (understood as positive amounts 
to the recipient). The gift is then doubled or not with a certain probability. They 
implement two different treatments, in the first one just the subject playing the role of 
the dictator has the possibility to do it, while in the second treatment both of them can 
give a gift to each other, that is, both play the role of the dictator simultaneously. And 
each subject making the decision is allowed to condition it on whether the gift is 
doubled or not. 
The results the authors find are: firstly, when just one of the players can decide 
whether to give a gift to the other one or not, fairness appears to be more relevant for 
dictators than efficiency, since they never provide the recipient with a higher payoff 
than to themselves. Secondly, according to the answers of subjects playing the role of 
recipients on their hypothetical choices if they were playing the role of the dictator (that 
is, a measure of expectations regarding gifts) they obtain almost identical values for 
real and expected choices. Additionally, they observe that: “generous donors expect 
generosity to prevail in general” (p.469). Finally, and regarding the second treatment, in 
which there is mutual gift giving, different behaviours are found, in particular, selfish or 
distrustful subjects and trustful or efficiency-minded players. 
All in all, they conclude that gift giving is strongly influenced by the interactive 
relationship with the other subject (unilateral or two-sided). Moreover, the amount of 
the gift is restricted by fairness constraints, since dictators are not going to put 
themselves at a disadvantage with respect to the other subject. And, at last, they affirm 
that: “efficiency gains may further gift giving only when reciprocal fairness is expected” 
(p.472). 
Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) carry out a dictator game experiment with four 
different treatments, in which the main varying feature is transparency, that is to say, 
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the common knowledge of the actions that the dictator can take and their subsequent 
consequences. Thus, in the four treatments there is a gradual reduction of 
transparency or, in other words, increasing uncertainty, in that respect. 
Subjects are randomly assigned to one treatment and are anonymously and by 
random matched in pairs. They play a dictator game with two possible actions, either to 
choose and even allocation of the endowment or an uneven one. The first treatment is 
a standard dictator game. In the second treatment dictators are, in principle, not aware 
of the consequences of their choices for the recipient, but have the option of getting 
that information by clicking a button. The third treatment differs in the addition of a new 
dictator, that is, subjects are matched in groups of three, playing two of them the role of 
dictators and the third one the role of recipient. And in the fourth treatment, dictators 
are allowed to leave their decision to chance, thus avoiding responsibility for their 
choices. In fact, they have a limited time period to make a decision, and if they do not 
do it, the software chooses one of the two possible options with the same probability. 
Therefore, with the setting they use, the authors create a “wiggle room” for selfish 
behaviour. And what they observe is that in the first treatment fairness prevails, since 
most dictators choose the even allocation. In the other treatments, they find that 
subjects act in a way in such they keep uninformed about the consequences of their 
choices, and they take advantage of that uncertainty to make an unfair choice. 
Moreover, many of them delay making a decision in order to leave that responsibility to 
the computer. 
To sum up, if fairness is a principle for subjects, the reduction in transparency in the 
additional treatments should have no effect on their decisions. However, they find that 
dictators are more selfish and less fair as the level of transparency is reduced. The 
conclusion derived from these findings is that transparency is a relevant element on 
dictator game experiments when trying to analyse fairness motivations and that 
depending on its level, subjects will show a more or less fair behaviour. 
3. Fairness in public goods experiments 
The literature on this issue is not very extensive. However, in this section we will 
include studies that deal with fairness in the context of public goods experiments. 
The basic public goods game consists of a group of subjects who are endowed with 
a number of tokens and have to decide on the share of that total amount to be invested 
in a public good. The tokens which are not invested are kept.  
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An important element of this game is the return for each subject from the investment 
in the public good, which is lower than the return derived from no investing. Therefore, 
since the return from the private good exceeds the one of the public good, the 
dominant strategy for each player and the rational Nash equilibrium is to free ride, that 
is, to invest zero on the public good. 
However, and according to Chaudhuri (2011), the general result on public goods 
experiments is that contributions are on average around 40%-60%, but repetition leads 
to a decay towards the 0 provision, since more subjects start choosing to free ride. 
Therefore, the observations of positive and substantial contributions to the public good 
and the gradual reduction on them suggest that considerations about fairness or 
altruism, as well as other social preferences are essential when analysing this kind of 
game. 
In fact, the first evidence of fairness concerns of subjects in this kind of game is 
found by Marwell and Ames (1981). They run a series of public goods experiments 
among which the setting characteristics vary, and they observe that, regardless of 
those variations, average contributions to the public good always range between 40 
and 60 percent of the total endowment. 
Additionally, when asked about what is considered fairness for them in this situation, 
most subjects refer to half or more of the players’ endowment as a fair contribution, and 
those who declare that they consider fairness when making their decisions and define 
as fair high contribution levels, are the ones that contribute more. 
Hence, the authors prove that fairness is crucial in any interaction of this type, and 
needs to be considered when analysing the results of any public goods experiment. 
In his study, Andreoni (1988) tries to analyse the phenomenon of free-riding. In 
particular, why it is rarely observed in single-shot games but generally found in finitely 
repeated settings (decay phenomenon). For that purpose, two hypotheses are 
examined: the learning hypothesis, which states that subjects cannot learn their 
incentives by a single-shot, and need repetition to attain such learning; and the 
strategies hypothesis, which maintains that repetition allows subjects to indicate future 
actions to each other and therefore there is room for rational strategic play in repeated 
games. 
The experiment consists of a standard public goods game iterated 10 times. 
Additionally, there is an unexpected restart at the end of these periods. Each repetition 
includes groups of 5 subjects, where each one of them is given a budget of 50 tokens. 
Tokens can be invested either in a private good (Individual Exchange) or in a public 
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good (Group Exchange). The return on the private good is 1 cent, whereas the return 
on the public good is 0.5.  
Moreover, there are two treatments, Partners and Strangers. In the first one subjects 
play the game always with the same group members, and in the second one, after 
each repetition of the game, the groups are reassigned.  
The results are: subjects in the Partners treatment contribute less to the public good 
and free ride more frequently. Strangers are momentarily affected by the restart, 
whereas Partners are significantly and permanently affected by it. Thus, strong 
evidence against the strategies hypothesis is found (subjects who cannot play 
strategically (Strangers) contribute more), and also against the learning hypothesis 
(subjects under both conditions are affected by the restart). 
Therefore, there are other motives explaining the observations found, namely 
fairness motivations of subjects which lead to positive contributions to the public good, 
and even higher by subjects playing under the Strangers treatment, and to not reaching 
the Nash equilibrium of free-riding even with repetition of the game. 
Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002) use three slightly different versions of a two-
subject public goods game. The first one is a simultaneous version of the game, 
whereas the second one is sequential, and in the last one the supply of the public good 
is determined by the maximum of the two contributions to it (best-shot game). 
What the authors find is that the common free-riding equilibrium prediction holds 
neither in the simultaneous nor in the sequential game, but it is approached in the third 
version of the game. Moreover, when comparing the sequential and simultaneous 
games, subjects’ behaviour is found to be really similar. 
All in all, the selfish equilibrium prediction cannot be sustained and fairness models 
need to be used in order to explain these findings. 
To our knowledge, the first attempt to evaluate the effect of including the possibility 
of punishing in the context of a public goods experiment can be attributed to Fehr and 
Gächter (2000a). For that purpose, the authors implement four different treatments, 
which combine the conditions of punishment and no punishment option, with both the 
strangers and partners situations. The punishment option is included by a second 
stage in the game, in which each subject is informed about the individual contributions 
of the other group members. Then, they can punish each other by assigning 
punishment points, and the cost of that decision is a reduction of 10 percent of their 
payoff (from the first stage), which cannot become negative. 
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As for the results, in the conditions in which punishment is not allowed, contribution 
levels show a gradual decay towards very low provision levels, whereas in the 
treatments with punishment average contribution rates are above 50 percent of the 
endowment. And they are higher in the partners treatment (95%) than in the strangers 
condition (58%). 
Therefore, the authors find a high willingness to punish free-riders among those 
subjects who contribute to the public good, even though punishment is costly for them. 
And the punishment is higher the greater is the deviation from the groups’ average 
contribution. This provides strong evidence of fairness motivations, since subjects are 
willing to undertake an important cost in order to punish those who free ride, who are 
unfair. 
4. Fairness in market experiments  
Market experiments have been used for many years in the economic literature. In 
fact, according to DeYoung (1993), the first article based on the results of a laboratory 
market experiment was a study of imperfect competition carried out by Chamberlin 
(1948). After that, other authors also used this kind of experiments in order to find 
evidence of the Cournot model [Hoggatt (1959), Sauermann and Selten (1960)] and of 
the working of the laws of competitive supply and demand in the laboratory [Smith 
(1962)]. 
As DeYoung (1993) states, there are several advantages of carrying out market 
experiments in the laboratory. For instance, the controlled environment allows for the 
design of the specifically desired market structures. And the possibility of replication of 
the same experiment or a modified version of it permits obtaining enough data to 
extract useful conclusions. 
And that is why market experiments have been and are important tools in 
experimental economics, and they are widely used to test diverse theories and 
hypotheses. 
In what follows we will include the most relevant examples of literature in which 
laboratory market experiments are used in order to test fairness motivations and 
concerns.  
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986b) use a survey in order to infer rules of 
fairness in the market. Therefore, they make a first approach to the identification of 
community standards of fairness and their implications on market outcomes. In 
particular, subjects are asked a set of 18 questions framed in the context of firms 
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making a decision on the price of a product or setting the wage of workers. Under this 
framework, subjects have to evaluate the fairness of the corresponding actions. 
What the authors conclude from this study is that practices which are profitable and 
not clearly dishonest are likely to be considered unfair exploitations of firms’ market 
power. However, in some cases there are actions initially seen as unfair that slowly 
spread until they become fair for subjects. Moreover, a relevant framing effect is found, 
so that firms are highly motivated to frame their decisions in a way in which they 
appear to be fair. Finally, a relevant conclusion the authors find is that the rules of 
fairness that apply to prices, rents and wages are very similar. 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) design an experiment in order to analyse the 
impact of fairness on market prices. Their experiment consists of two stages; in the first 
one, wages are determined in a one-sided oral auction, which lasts three minutes, with 
employers as bidders who make wage proposals to workers. When an offer is 
accepted a binding contract is made and, in the second stage, workers choose their 
effort level. 
Under this setting, it is assumed that workers do not have any incentive to increase 
their effort above the minimum possible level. Then, if employers expect this to happen, 
they will not pay wages above the market-clearing level.  
Nonetheless, the results are contrary to this prediction. In fact, employers offer 
prices substantially above the market-clearing level, and expect workers to respond 
with high effort levels, that is to say, they await them to be fair and reciprocate their 
behaviour. And, on average, this is what happens. Moreover, repetition does not lead 
to the convergence of prices towards the market-clearing level. Therefore, the authors 
conclude that fairness plays an important role in this type of negotiations and it 
prevents wages from reaching the market-clearing level, remaining always above it. 
Similarly, Fehr and Falk (1999) carry out a double auction experiment with 
incomplete contracts3. They implement two treatments, one in which effort is 
exogenously given and another one in which workers decide their effort level. 
There are two stages, in the first one wages are determined through a double 
auction, in which both workers and firms interact. If there is an agreement, a labour 
contract is made. In the second stage, the worker decides the effort level. In the 
treatment with exogenous effort the second stage is not included in the design. 
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The main results are: first, workers make low offers, which firms reject; second, 
even though firms know that workers are willing to work for lower wages, their offers 
are on average greater than those of workers; third, workers reciprocate firms’ wages, 
that is, low wages lead to low effort levels and high wages to high effort levels; and 
fourth, when effort is exogenously determined, firms offer lower wages, being 
significantly smaller in that treatment. 
In sum, firms do not enforce low wages when effort is endogenously determined 
because they predict that they will have a strong impact on workers’ effort and 
performance, but they do so when effort levels are exogenous. Therefore, this study 
shows limited or non-existent concerns of fairness on firms whereas workers are 
clearly motivated by fairness enforcement. 
Abeler et al. (2010) carry out an experiment in which a principal is matched with two 
agents; in the first stage of the game, the agents decide simultaneously and 
independently on their effort level, and in the second stage, being aware of this 
decision, the principal chooses the wages for both. There are two treatments, in the 
first one just one wage level can be chosen, which is paid to the two agents, and in the 
second one the principal can choose a different wage for each one. After each period, 
principals and agents are randomly rematched. 
The results which are obtained are that greater effort levels are rewarded by higher 
wages, and agents who are paid equal wages show significantly lower effort levels than 
agents that are paid individually. Therefore, strong evidence of fairness motivations on 
subjects is found. Specifically, it is shown that equal wages often lead to unfair 
situations in the view of workers, who are importantly heterogeneous in their 
performance. 
Also under the framing of a principal-agent experiment, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) 
find evidence of fairness motivations on subjects. Their setting involves two tasks the 
principal offers the agent to engage simultaneously, and the agent decides on the effort 
used in each one of them. 
The best situation for the principal is one in which the agent expends the same 
amount of effort in both tasks. This effort is perfectly observable by the principal but, 
while in the first task this is easily verifiable in court, in the second one it is not, so that 
it cannot be contracted in this case.  
Two are the types of contract that can be offered. The first one is a piece-rate 
contract, which pays a fixed base wage and a piece rate for each unit of effort spent on 
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task one. The other one is a bonus contract, which again specifies a fixed wage and a 
completely voluntary bonus based on the agent’s performance. 
The results show that bonus contracts outperform piece-rate, that is, most principals 
offer the first type of contract. Additionally, many principals give considerable bonuses 
as a reward for high efforts in the two tasks. Moreover, many agents decide to put 
great effort in both tasks. Finally, a great number of agents with a piece-rate contract 
put no effort on the second task and instead fully concentrate on the first one. 
Therefore, the basic conclusion from this study is that fairness concerns matter, and 
they are capable of inducing some principals to pay a bonus and encourage agents to 
reciprocate by increasing their effort. 
With a similar setting, Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein (2002) run a principal-
agent experiment. In its first stage, the principal decides on a contract consisting of a 
fixed wage and a return share and offers it to the agent, who accepts or rejects it. 
Then, the worker decides on the effort level. 
The authors observe that in most cases (70%) principals offer negative fixed wages 
as well as incentive-compatible return shares. And these are rejected in 20% of the 
cases. Moreover, effort changes according to the offered contracts, that is to say, the 
more generous are the contracts, the higher is the effort level chosen by the agent. 
All in all, the authors conclude that agents care about fairness, and fair sharing is a 
relevant element influencing subjects’ behaviour. Therefore, fairness should be taken 
into account when examining this type of interaction as it significantly affects the 
outcomes of it. 
Fehr, Tougareva and Fischbacher (2014) run an experiment in order to find 
evidence against the possible criticism on the relevance of fairness concerns that in 
real life the involved stakes are much higher than in laboratory experiments.  
For that purpose, they replicate the work by Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter 
(1998). The difference between these studies is that the first one is carried out with an 
Austrian sample, whereas the second one is run with Russian people. The authors 
implement a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have 
the possibility to reciprocate favours. They use two treatments, in one of them the stake 
is equivalent to other experiments, whereas in the other one it is much higher (between 
two and three times the average monthly income of participants). The kind of market 
they define is a gift-exchange, in which wages are determined in a competitive market 
and then workers choose their effort level, once the labour contracts are established. 
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The main findings are: under both conditions wages are higher than they should be 
in equilibrium; in particular, they are three times greater than the prediction of the 
competitive model. Moreover, workers’ decisions on their effort are not significantly 
affected by the increase in the size of the stake, that is, there are no important 
differences between the observations under each of the treatments. Additionally, at 
different stake levels no differences in wages are found. Finally, under both conditions 
workers reciprocate through their effort choices the non-competitive wage offers made 
by employers.  
All in all, the authors conclude that fairness concerns are sufficiently powerful so as 
to outbalance competitive forces and lead to wage levels well above the equilibrium 
ones. And even more, fairness plays a relevant role even when stake levels are 
relatively high. 
In their study, Engelmann, Friedrichsen and Kübler (2018) go a step further and 
provide an attempt to directly test the relationship between market behaviour inside 
and outside the laboratory. 
The authors implement an experiment with three differentiated parts. The first one is 
carried out before entering the laboratory, and it consists in measuring the willingness 
of subjects to pay for fair trade chocolate bars, instead of larger conventional chocolate 
bars. Then, subjects participate in a market game in the laboratory. And in the third 
part, the authors elicit the premium participants are willing to pay for fair trade, through 
an incentive compatible random price mechanism. 
What they find is that there exists a high correlation between the results from the 
first and third part, that is, fair trade preferences outside the laboratory. On one side the 
choice of the preferred kind of chocolate bar made before the experiment, and on the 
other side the willingness to pay a premium for the fair product. Moreover, regarding 
the second part, that is to say, the market game, it is observed that those subjects 
choosing the fair trade chocolate bar in the first part are more likely to act fairly in the 
experiment. And the same happens with those who show a positive fair trade premium 
in the third part. 
In sum, subjects’ choices regarding fair trade are closely related to real preferences 
on fairness. In other words, fairness preferences are relevant for consumption choices 
outside the laboratory. 
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5. Discussion  
This dissertation has reviewed literature on fairness concerns in bargaining, markets 
and public goods experiments. The general finding is that subjects are aware of and 
care about fairness motivations when making their decisions. 
In particular, in the ultimatum game proposers offer positive and significantly high 
shares of the available amount (30%-40%) and responders reject many of these 
proposals. And in the dictator game subjects offer positive and important shares 
(around 20%-30% on average), even though their proposals cannot be rejected. In 
public goods experiments, concerns for fairness are found in the form of positive and 
substantial contributions to the public good. In fact, average contributions are between 
40%-60% of the total endowment. And market experiments provide further evidence of 
fairness motivations, as employers offer wages well above the market-clearing level, 
and workers respond with high effort levels.  
There are different elements which help explaining and reinforce fairness on 
subjects, and these have been analysed in the three different contexts. Nonetheless, in 
some cases fairness could have been examined with different designs which best 
isolate this phenomenon. Therefore, in this section we propose new ideas and 
alternative designs for treating fairness in these differentiated but related contexts. 
A crucial element connecting the three groups of experiments is punishment. 
Punishment to unfair subjects is found to be relevant for explaining the deviation from 
perfect equilibrium [Bolton and Zwick (1995)], and it its effect is so strong that players 
are observed to be willing to punish subjects which behave unfairly even if that implies 
lower own payoffs [Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a)]. Even though punishment 
is not explicitly analysed in market experiments, it is implicit in the framing of the 
reviewed articles, since the worker has the possibility of “punishing” the firm by 
choosing a low effort level as the response to a low wage offer. However, it would be 
interesting to run an experiment in which under a principal-agent framing, the employee 
has the choice of punishing the employer. For instance, a possible design is one in 
which both subjects reach an agreement in the first stage, through a double auction, in 
which wages are determined. After a labour contract is made, the agent decides the 
effort level. In the second stage, the agent becomes aware of all the relevant 
information concerning the corresponding company (size, revenues, etc.) and can then 
decide whether to renounce or not the job. Under this setting, if agents are concerned 
about fairness enforcement, and they believe the principal has been unfair, they are 
expected to renounce so as to punish that behaviour. 
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Information is also proven to be a relevant element when analysing fairness in these 
contexts [Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996)]. Therefore, 
we could test whether the combination of both elements (punishment and information) 
leads to stronger fairness effects on subjects, as it is expected. For instance, following 
the design by Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996), we could implement an ultimatum game in 
which, in a first stage proposers have complete information about the returns for both 
subjects, whereas responders face incomplete information in this respect. Proposers 
make their decision, and responders accept or reject it. In a second stage, responders 
get the previously unavailable information, and can then vary their decision, thus 
getting both players a payoff of zero. If subjects care about fairness, and the proposer 
has been unfair, they are expected to renounce to their own payoff so as to punish the 
other player. If either the proposer has been fair, or they are not concerned about 
fairness enforcement, they will keep the money. 
Moreover, fairness motivations are reinforced when subjects gain the right of getting 
more money, that is, when their roles are assigned according to a deserving ranking. 
Therefore, property rights are a key element, since they provide players with the feeling 
that they deserve the money because they have gained the right to get it [Hoffman et 
al. (1994), Schurter and Wilson (2009), Cappelen et al. (2007)]. 
A common limitation in the three groups of experiments is the lack of a deeper 
analysis of the role of gender; its importance and possible gender differences regarding 
fairness. Therefore, future research must be done on gender differences regarding 
fairness, by carrying out several experiments in order to obtain evidence of their 
existence and to analyse them in depth. And a possible starting point is the work by 
Doñate-Buendía (2017), in which a pilot experiment is carried out through a survey 
replicating the study by Eckel & Grossman (1996), but adding an additional treatment 
to the original experimental design. Under this new setting, subjects have to give up a 
higher amount of money so as to punish the unfair player and compensate the fair 
subject, and gender differences on fairness can be analysed. Thus, this study could be 
broaden and replicated in a laboratory experiment, to test the existence of gender 
differences on subjects’ fairness concerns. 
All in all, several studies have given evidence that fairness is a key element when 
analysing subjects’ behaviour in bargaining, public goods and market experiments. But 
further research is needed, and a good model of fairness has to take into account 
some elements we have previously named, such as, property rights, information, 
gender and punishment. As already explained, these are key factors for analysing and 
explaining subjects’ fairness motivations in these contexts. 
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At last, we propose the design of a meta study on ultimatum game experiments. A 
meta study is a quantitative literature review, which is more objective and may provide 
more information and evidence than a qualitative review, as the one we have 
presented. In this kind of work, a set of studies concerning one specific topic is 
gathered, and the data from them is obtained in order to build up a large common 
dataset that allows for a joint analysis. 
There exist a small number of meta studies on economic experiments, and then it 
would be interesting to create one concerning such an important issue as fairness. 
In this sense, Engel (2011) presents a meta study on dictator game experiments, in 
which he assesses the effect of single manipulations on the parameters, controlling for 
many alternative explanatory factors. Moreover, the dataset he obtains allows for 
comparing alternative specifications of the statistical model used for examining the data 
from dictator games. In particular, the author calculates the overall average percentage 
of giving (generosity), and several factors that can help to explain it (framing, social 
distance, incentives, etc.). 
Therefore, one option is to get the dataset from this study and use it for analysing 
the results from dictator game experiments and how fairness concerns are relevant 
when trying to explain them. 
And another possibility is to do a meta study of public goods experiments, ultimatum 
experiments, or market experiments, and analyse the main outcomes from the 
corresponding literature and the factors which can explain them (fairness concerns, 
among others). Then, we should look for all the literature available and useful for the 
purpose of the analysis, get the data from the experiments, and build up our own 
dataset in order to examine it. 
The usage of a meta study will provide us with some benefits, in particular, the 
accuracy of the estimations is improved thanks to the greater amount of data; the 
results derived from it can be generalised to a wider population; the statistical power 
increases and the inconsistency of results among different studies can be carefully 
analysed. 
Therefore, we decide to propose a meta study on ultimatum game experiments 
since, as we have said, it is a good tool to get robust results which can be generalised 
to a larger population. We believe the ultimatum game is the more appropriate one 
because the literature on experiments of this game is really extensive, and from our 
point of view, it is the “basic game”, that is, the most representative one of bargaining 
situations. Moreover, it shows the simplest possible design of interactions between 
24 
subjects; the dictator game is even simpler, in fact it is a restricted version of this game, 
but the interaction between subjects is nearly non-existent. 
In the meta study we want to summarise the broad evidence from ultimatum game 
experiments which have been published over the last nearly 40 years, since the game 
was firstly introduced by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982). 
For that purpose and similarly to the design by Engel (2011), we propose the 
following model: 
Yi= βXi + ui + ei 
where Yi is the the dependent variable, and is the mean percentage of acceptance 
of the corresponding offers; Xi is a set of explanatory variables; ui is the error between 
studies, and ei is the residual (within studies). 
Contrary to Engel (2011), who analyses the dictator game, and uses as dependent 
variable the mean fraction of the pie dictators give recipients, we want to find the 
average percentage of acceptance, and therefore analyse the distribution of mean 
acceptance per treatment, and the different explanatory factors of it. This way, we will 
analyse the decisions of the responders, and their underlying motives. Another option 
would be to use as dependent variable the mean fraction of the total amount proposers 
offer to responders, and then study the behaviour of proposers. 
In our case, we will compute the distribution of mean acceptance per treatment and 
then try to find the explanatory factors of the observed behaviour.  
In this sense, we would like to give light to questions like whether repetition is a key 
element explaining the rate of acceptance of offers in ultimatum game experiments, 
and if it has a positive or a negative effect on this variable. Moreover, we would like to 
test if anonymity leads to substantial differences on the decision of accepting or not the 
offers. Additionally, it would be interesting to know whether responders are motivated 
by fairness concerns or their behaviour is driven by revenge motives instead. In other 
words, we would like to see if punishment is a relevant explanatory factor. We would 
also like to learn the role of information as regards the decision of responders in 
ultimatum game experiments, as well as if framing affects their choices. At last, we 
would like to test if there are gender differences in the decision of acceptance of the 
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